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THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL ICT
REGULATORY SPACES
Raúl L. Katz
Abstract: This paper examines the role that existing Latin American policy institutions and 
regulatory coordination mechanisms (otherwise referred to as “regional regulatory spaces”) 
play in innovation and development of the ICT sector. In doing so, it recognizes that sector reg-
ulation does not currently match regional development, thereby limiting its potential progress. 
In order to shed light on the role that the “regional regulatory space” could potentially play, the 
author addresses three main questions:
·      Is there a hierarchy of policies by which it is presumed easy to “coordinate within well-de-
fined technical subjects” but extremely challenging to “agree in matters of public policy?”
·     What would happen if policy divergence became more important than convergence? Is it 
reasonable to consider creating “regional regulatory spaces?” or should we focus solely on 
technological coordination?
·     Do institutions capable of serving as effective regional regulatory spaces already exist 
in Latin America or should we consider modifying existing institutions or creating 
new institutions?
After analyzing these three overarching areas of concern, this paper then discusses the need to 
create a regional space in order to harmonize ICT regulatory frameworks and public policies. 
Ultimately, this work aims to advance the institutional formulation beyond pre-existing efforts.
Keywords: Latin America, public policy, telecom, ICT, regulation, innovation, development.
Comments: Paper presented at the IBEI-CEPAL international seminar “Innovación y regu-
lación en las TIC.Una perspectiva comparada entre Europa y América Latina”. Barcelona, 30 
September – 1 October 2013.
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1. INTRODUCTION
 This paper identifies the existing policy making institutions and the regula-
tory coordination mechanisms (the so-called “regional regulatory spaces”) within 
the Latin American information and communication technology (ICT) industries and 
analyzes their role in stimulating innovation and development. It asserts that sector 
regulation is not in line with regional development, thereby creating artificial barri-
ers to progress. In this context, the paper differentiates between the formulation of in-
tegrated holistic public policies (such as the deployment a regional Internet intercon-
nection architecture) and the mere regional technical coordination necessary in order 
to encourage more efficient sector performance. As such, this work considers the 
suitability of regional regulation spaces within two levels: 1) the definition of public 
policies that stimulate ICT sector development and 2) the coordination of integrated 
and efficient technological development (such as the prevention of interference when 
managing spectrum).
 Furthermore, the premise of this paper (the need for “regional regulatory 
spaces”) incorporates a series of implications that will be treated as hypotheses. First, 
at a fundamental level, a conceptual equivalence is implicitly assumed between 1) 
the regional development of public ICT policies and 2) that which will henceforth 
be referred to as technological coordination (defined as the coordination of spectrum 
assignment, numeration, technological standards, etc.). To what extent are these two 
conceptual policy domains equivalent? Alternatively, is there a hierarchy of policies 
by which it is presumed easy to “coordinate within well-defined technical subjects” 
but extremely challenging to “agree in matters of public policy?”
 Secondly, the paper assumes that structural forces within the region drive 
regulatory convergence, largely due to the subsequent need for “regional regulation 
spaces.” What would happen if policy divergence became more important than con-
vergence? Within the context of policy divergence, is it reasonable to consider the 
possibility of creating “regional regulation spaces?” Or, alternatively, should we fo-
cus solely on technological coordination, leaving each country in charge of defining 
its own public policies?
 Third, this paper understands that the establishment of “regional regulatory 
spaces” could become the variable needed to improve national ICT regulation and 
policy making in Latin America. In other words, this work examines the possibility 
that regional regulation could play a positive and meaningful role in the develop-
ment of national policy frameworks.1  In this sense, one could conclude that even if 
-4-
1.     See Jordana, J., Levi-Four, and Pig, I. (2005). The limits of Europeanization: regulatory reforms in the Spanish and Portuguese Telecommunications and 
Electricity Sectors. European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 9 (2005) N° 10; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-010a.htm.
IBEI W
orking Papers - Telefonica Chair Series · 2014/44
the divergent ICT policy tendencies outweigh the convergent forces (in other words, 
“what separates us in matters of ICT policy is larger than what unites us”), the “re-
gional regulation spaces” could still play a positive role by fostering the dialogue and 
experience sharing environment that could contribute to a convergence in policies. 
While one could say that regional regulatory spaces are limited in their ability to 
build a convergent environment, there is such a need for a regional agenda that there 
is no other choice than to face their development and promotion head on. In regards 
to this last hypothesis, do the institutions capable of serving as effective regional 
regulatory spaces already exist in Latin America or should we consider modifying or 
creating new institutions?
 This paper will first approach these three questions, trying to shed light on 
the role that the “regional regulation space” may come to play. After analyzing these 
three hypotheses, we will then discuss the need to create a regional space in order to 
harmonize ICT regulatory frameworks and public policies.
 
2. TECHNICAL COORDINATION VERSUS PUBLIC 
REGIONAL POLICIES
 
 A “regional regulatory space” may respond to two different types of objec-
tives. Associated with the principle of international harmonization, the first objective 
assumes that positive externalities stimulate cooperation among nations.2 In this in-
stance, when developing public policies, nations renounce their complete autonomy 
because they recognize that the benefits of coordination outweigh total independ-
ence. In other words, while this coordination does bring some constraints, the bene-
fits of developing an efficient ICT infrastructure far outweigh these drawbacks.
 The clearest example is seen in the countries’ coordination in managing in-
terference when assigning radio electric spectrum. As countries recognize the benefit 
of reducing interference at their borders, the operators who provide service in each 
country in turn may face constraints in terms of spectrum assignment.
-5-
2.     See Dolowitz, D.P. and Marsh, D. (2000) ‘Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policymaking’, Governance 13: 5–24.
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 It is important to recognize that technological coordination among countries 
does not necessarily imply an imposition of one country’s approach on neighboring 
countries (although in certain cases it may exist de facto when one of the neighboring 
countries has much more economic power). The process of technological coordina-
tion involves negotiation between states that tends to balance regional objectives 
and national goals. In many cases, this negotiation may not result in a successful 
resolution because each party is driven by contradictory objectives. The definition of 
digital television standards, where industrial policy considerations could condition 
opposing approaches, serves as an example of this situation. However, in most cases, 
technological coordination tends to yield positive results (in a way that resembles the 
sequential iterations of the Prisoner Dilemma game3).
 The formulation of regional ICT public policies, on the other hand, responds 
to a more complex process. As a starting point, it presupposes a certain degree of po-
litical or economic integration. In the field of economics, shared objectives (econom-
ic growth) or international competition (which spurs a response to a disadvantage 
in the balance of trade) guide integration. In this sense, the alignment of regional 
policy objectives extends far beyond the aforementioned bilateral coordination. In 
this context, when formulating regional public policies, each country evaluates the 
benefits and risks of “mercantilist” autonomy and integrated development. How-
ever, as more nations take part in this process, the more complex it becomes and, in 
turn, success is less probable. For example, reaching an agreement on roaming rates 
or Internet interconnection framework requires a much more complex alignment of 
economic policy objectives than simply coordinating radio frequency spectrum as-
signment in border zones.
 In sum, technological coordination is easier to achieve than the formulation of 
regional ICT policies. In fact, research has shown that the convergence of public pol-
icies or regulatory frameworks is more likely to occur when the objective involves a 
clear decision (for example, spectrum assignment). On the other hand, if the policy is 
formulated based on general principles, thereby allowing each country to formulate 
its own policy instruments and implementation mechanisms, the probability of suc-
cess diminishes substantially. In this manner, technological coordination and the for-
mulation of regional policies within the creation of “regional spaces” assumes a risk 
of replicating one of the numerous examples of Latin American coordination failures.
-6-
3.     See Axelrod, R. (1984) The evolution of cooperation. NY: Basic Books.
3. CONVERGENCE VERSUS DIVERGENCE IN THE 
DIFFUSION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
 The creation of a “regional regulation ICT space” assumes there is a need to 
promote the diffusion of common public policies within a process of convergence. 
Levi-Faur and Jordana define convergence as the process that leads to the adoption of 
common regulatory frameworks and similar policies, while divergence suggests the 
formulation of autonomous policies based on the trajectory and idiosyncratic roots of 
each country.4 Along these lines, convergence presupposes a certain similarity among 
countries in terms of their policy objectives, which include content, political instru-
ments, and styles of governance. 
 Levi-Faur and Jordana introduce the concept of divergent convergence, 
wherein the public policy diffusion process may simultaneously involve convergent 
and divergent tendencies. While certainly possible, we consider it necessary to deter-
mine which of the two tendencies is more important. For example, if divergence ex-
ists around “nontrivial” policy domains, the creation of a “regional regulatory space” 
may be unviable.
 For this reason, when considering the viability of a “regional regulatory 
space,” it is important to assess the relative importance of forces that might encour-
age divergence (we label these forces “centrifugal”) or convergence (“centripetal” 
forces), promoting greater coherence in the adoption of regional public policies. If 
the forces that encourage divergence are stronger than those forces that oppose them, 
the possibility of success in the creation of a “regional space” will be severely limited. 
We will now examine the “centrifugal” and “centripetal” tendencies that occur in the 
Latin American ICT sector.
3.1. Tendencies that  encourage convergence in the diffusion of  ICT 
public  policies
 By definition, a “centripetal” tendency drives convergence of ICT public poli-
cies. These forces encourage the different agents who are formulating the public pol-
icies to share ideologies, symbolical codes, and beliefs, fostering a learning process 
and experience sharing supported by a “regional regulation space.” In this case, we 
identify three forces.
-7-
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4.     See Levi-Faur, D. and Jordana, J. Regulatory capitalism: policy irritants and convergent divergence.
3.1.1. Diffusion of regulatory models
 Since the 1980s, at an international level, the convergence of ICT policies has 
been guided by a process of diffusion of the frameworks and models developed ini-
tially in mature countries. Through this process, public policy implementation tends 
to follow a predetermined path of imitation determined by political, cultural, and 
local geopolitical parameters as well as by “herd behavior.”5 For example, the adop-
tion of two regulatory models in telecommunications - the creation of a regulatory 
authority and the privatization of the incumbent - may be graphed in an S curve 
similar to the one observed in the case of innovation diffusion (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Diffusion of Regulatory Models in Telecommunications (Number of 
adopting countries)
Source: ITU
Figure 1 shows that, after the incubation period that extends from 1980 to 1992, the 
adoption of both policy initiatives (privatization and regulation) accelerated glob-
ally. This phase of accelerated diffusion culminates in 2002 for the creation of inde-
pendent regulatory agencies and in 2005 for the privatization of incumbents. Thus, 
these two key changes to the telecommunications regulatory framework were dif-
fused globally - reaching 120 countries - within a 25-year period.
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5.    See Levi-Faur, D. y Jordana, J. op. cit.
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 While the process of public policy adoption among governments is based on 
communication behavioral patterns similar to those that occur between individuals 
when it comes to innovation diffusion (where the process may also be plotted in an 
S curve), it is important to emphasize that the diffusion of regulatory models is not 
necessarily guided by random social interactions. Indeed, we believe policy diffusion 
to be a much more deterministic process following three mechanisms. The first one 
is the so-called geographic proximity effect, whereby the diffusion of public policies 
is predetermined by the similarity of the situations and challenges of neighboring 
countries. If Country X faces challenges similar to those challenges of neighboring 
Country Y, it is highly likely that the government of Country X will adopt policies 
previously implemented by Country Y. This behavior results from the geographical 
proximity that allows public officials to interact frequently, a process known as “cop-
ying your neighbor.” The term was first introduced to explain the diffusion of water 
treatment policies in municipal administrations in the United States in the 1960s.
 The second regulatory model diffusion mechanism is called the “lateral dif-
fusion mechanism,” whereby the imitation of models and policy frameworks is the 
result of several countries either sharing the same cultural background or operating 
within the same social and economic context. The difference between the geograph-
ical proximity and the lateral diffusion mechanisms is that in the second case, both 
countries do not necessarily have to be neighbors so long as they have similar social 
and economic and political systems.
 The third regulatory and policy diffusion mechanism is the so-called hier-
archical diffusion effect. As its name indicates, central countries initially introduce 
public policies that are then later adopted by peripheral nations that follow the lead 
of more mature nations. To conclude, when looking at public policy adoption, what 
may seem to be a random process is, in reality, a result of diffusion determined by the 
combination of the three pre-defined forces: geographic proximity, lateral diffusion, 
and hierarchical influence.
 The processes described above may be rationalized in order to demonstrate 
that policy formulation is more than simply imitation (see table 1):
-9-
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Table 1: Rationale in the diffusion of regulatory models.
 As multiple countries adopt the same policy or regulatory framework and the 
diffusion process gains momentum, we can observe the phenomenon that Levi-Faur 
refers to as “herd behavior.” The need to reduce uncertainty in the policy-making 
process (which results from imitating a leading country), the imperative to reduce 
information costs (policy imitation reduces the need to analyze the specificities of 
the adopting country), and the legitimization provided by the opinion leaders of 
the country that originally espoused the model may all guide the herding process.6 
As such, the selection of a specific regulatory model or policy framework is deter-
mined not by the available information and analysis of the situation, but instead by 
a process of imitation. In this sense, the leading countries influence the behavior and 
cognitive framework of the nations adopting a new public policy. When these signals 
and changes in policy lead to convergence of an important number of countries, we 
then witness herd behavior. 
 In terms of the transfer of regulatory and policy frameworks, herding exhibits 
several peculiar effects. For one, numerous countries undertake similar policy deci-
sions (e.g. the privatization of the predominant telecommunications operator) within 
a very short period of time. Underpinning this process is a spreading mechanism that 
facilitates the diffusion of the model. Secondly, we also see incentives to imitative 
behavior. For example, a certain policy may have greater value as more countries 
choose to adopt it. In other words, one country may think, “if all these countries 
have privatized, we can’t go wrong by imitating them.” This rationale is known as 
the stimulus of uncertainty reduction. Herding also enhances the reputation of the 
-10-
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Rationale in the selection of the policy modelDiffusion Force
Geographical proximity
Lateral diffusion
If the neighboring country has previously adopted a certain pol-
icy or regulatory model, it is highly likely that this model might 
be suited to address the needs of the country that is trying to 
define its own model because both countries have similar needs 
and challenges.
If countries share a social, economic, political, and cultural 
background, it is highly likely that they will adopt the same 
policy model.
Hierarchical diffusion
If the central countries have previously adopted a certain model, 
it is likely that a peripheral country will adopt this same model 
in order to achieve similar development stage as that of the 
central country.
6.     According to Levi-Faur and Jordana, “Most cases of diffusion are based not on rational learning but on a myriad of mechanisms in which the rational 
component, if any, remains small” (Levi-Faur and Jordana, Regulatory Capitalism: Policy Irritants and Convergent Divergence).
policy makers of the country adopting the new policy (“by privatizing the opera-
tor, we behave in the same way as all of these other important countries who have 
done so before”). Finally, herding reduces the costs of obtaining the information and 
analysis required to make an informed public policy decision, (we could label this as 
the value of the “benchmark”). Certain neo-institutional sociologists (Jepperson and 
Meyer, 1991; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997) have studied the process by 
which policy makers imitate their counterparts in other countries in order to reduce 
research costs and profit from legitimization.
 Within the public policy diffusion process, the behavior of specific countries 
may also determine the adoption of certain models. In this context, there exist “lead-
er” countries (that set an example that other nations tend to follow) and “follower” 
nations (who appear more conservative in implementing policy changes). In fact, Le-
vi-Faur has divided countries into three groups: “instigators” of regulatory policies, 
“followers,” and “laggards.”7
  The policy makers in instigator nations do not rely on previous mod-
els or examples when introducing regulatory or policy framework changes. As such, 
instigators may, at the same time, be categorized as leaders or radicals. Leader states 
adopt a certain regulatory model at the beginning of a diffusion process, significant-
ly influencing imitation and legitimacy. The United Kingdom, for instance, may be 
considered a telecommunications policy instigator. The privatizations of both Cable 
& Wireless (1981) and British Telecom (1984), the creation of independent regulatory 
agency Oftel (1984), market liberalization (1991), and the functional separation of BT 
(2005) all significantly influenced the adoption of similar policies by other countries. 
International credibility was also based on the fact that the changes in regulation 
were not associated with a unique political orientation; they were, in fact, initiated 
by a conservative administration and continued by a Labor government. At the same 
time, Great Britain is generally viewed as a nation with high regulatory capacity 
(technologically, economically, and legally).
 Countries that follow the instigators’ examples do not want to assume the 
risk of innovation when formulating their own regulatory frameworks. They tend 
to adapt to collective norms previously formulated by transnational institutions. 
Amongst the follower nations, Levi-Faur includes moderate and indecisive coun-
tries. In moderate countries, public administrators and politicians adopt a pragmatic 
rather than an ideological attitude when formulating regulatory policies. While these 
countries possess regulatory capacity, the adoption of new models tends to take place 
following an extensive process of evaluating their needs and the examples set forth 
-11-
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7.     This categorization is based on work conducted by Levi-Faur, D. Herding towards a New Convention: on herds, shepherds and lost sheep in the liberalization 
of the telecommunications and electricity industries.
by the “instigator” nations. Germany serves as an example of a moderate country. 
The privatization of Deutsche Telecom, the creation of an independent regulatory 
authority, and the liberalization of markets happened gradually, in part following the 
experiences of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and South Korea.
 The indecisive follower countries lack the regulatory capacity or the poli-
cy framework necessary to formulate telecommunication policies in the way that 
moderates can. Examples of other countries serve as their only point of reference. 
Therefore, the indecisive countries tend not to implement a certain policy until the 
number of adopters in the diffusion process reaches a tipping point (critical mass). 
This behavior is fairly similar to that of the laggards, but in the case of the laggards, 
the critical mass (number of prior adopters) is larger than in the case of indecisive 
countries. 
 Interestingly, the positions of the instigator, the follower, and the laggard are 
not static but may in fact change through time. For example, in terms of Latin Ameri-
can telecommunications, Chile was an instigator of privatization policies in the 1980s 
and, therefore, an example to observe and to follow. Indeed, Chile was one of the first 
countries in the world to privatize and liberalize its telecommunications industry.8 
However, the Chilean example has been generally discredited in more recent years 
for three reasons. First, the reforms were initiated under a military dictatorship with 
extreme neoliberal economic policies. Second, the Chilean economy is small com-
pared to many emerging countries and Chile’s example is not applicable to larger 
markets. Finally opening the markets resulted in a period of extreme frictional costs 
as the first private buyer of the telecommunications operator prematurely retreated 
under conditions of crisis.
 On the other hand, other Latin American countries have now become exam-
ples to be followed by their regional counterparts in terms of their ICT regulation 
and policies. Uruguay, for instance, has notably promoted the development of high 
technology in the context of state ownership of the incumbent. Meanwhile, Costa 
Rica has achieved a high rate of technological development through a combination 
of market liberalization policies and an independent regulatory authority.
 Beyond the factors mentioned above, the individual characteristics of each 
country and the institutions with which its policy makers are affiliated determine the 
diffusion and convergence of public policies. Affiliations are essential to the topic of 
this paper insofar as they make reference to the role of regional regulatory spaces. 
In this regard, public policies and regulatory mechanisms are diffused through in-
-12-
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8.     Chile began the privatization of its telecommunications sector in 1982, concluding the sale of its long-distance operators (ENTEL) as well as local (CTC) 
in 1985. An embryo of an autonomous regulatory agency was created in 1977 and the telecommunications market was liberalized in 1991.
stitutional networks that facilitate the transfer of models. The institutions involved 
in the diffusion of public policies and regulatory frameworks within the ICT arena 
fall into one of three categories.  First and foremost, transnational institutions (such 
as the European Commission, OECD, the World Bank,9 the United Nations, ECLAC, 
Organization of American States, CAF, and Inter-American Development Bank) play 
a key role in the transmission and promotion of regulatory framework and public 
policy recommendations.10 Second, public policy “entrepreneurs” are accounted for 
(consultants, experts, nongovernmental organizations) and should be viewed as pro-
moters of “better practices” and “benchmarks.” Third, we must also consider inter-
national organizations, both from inside the ICT sector (Regulatel, Berec) and outside 
it (Commonwealth, UNASUR). This way, the institutional factor (or the “regional 
regulation spaces”) plays an important role in the promotion of policy convergence.
 To conclude, policy diffusion processes, by means of their multiple mecha-
nisms, represent a powerful force of convergence in ICT regulatory and policy frame-
works. However, they are not the only force. Other factors will be examined in turn.
3.1.2. Regional  expansion of  global  operators
 Multinational enterprises, the second force, also drive the convergence of 
ICT regulatory and policy models. Considering the presence of global telecommuni-
cation operators throughout the Latin American countries, two forces may operate 
simultaneously to encourage the adoption of common public policies. These corpo-
rations act as policy advocates, promulgating those rules and policies that encourage 
profit, a concept known as “convergence driven market penetration.” Bennett (1991) 
illustrated this mechanism by referring to the action of multinational corporations 
that pressure governments to harmonize regulation as it relates to their products.
 At the same time, as a result or occasionally even as a preemptive move, 
countries may launch policies or regulatory framework to respond to competitive 
pressures from other nations in an effort to offer more attractive conditions for global 
operators. Holzinger and Knill (2005) labeled this process as convergence under reg-
ulatory competition.
 Thus, as either a reaction to the advocacy of multinational corporations or as a 
means to promote a favorable foreign investment environment, policy makers may in-
troduce ICT policy and regulatory initiatives, reflecting an additional convergence force.
-13-
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9.    See for example, the role that the World Bank fulfilled through the activity of its representative E.W. Kemmerer, in the promotion and development of 
financial institutions in the Andean region.
10.  The regulatory entities for telecommunications in Brazil and Argentina are designed according to the norms of better practices of the World Bank.
3.1.3. Economies of  scale in technology investment
 In telecommunications, scale economies also drive convergence of ICT reg-
ulatory and policy initiatives at multiple levels. In the first place, the objective of 
reaching a critical mass in order to secure a return to scale drive the unification 
of regional economic spaces to foster the economic sustainability of multinational 
telecommunications operators.  Depending on the point of view of regulatory com-
petition, certain nations may be incentivized to create common economic spaces to 
promote investment in the development and sustainability of telecommunications 
operators. The paradigmatic example of this tendency is represented by the actual 
discussion in the matter of a common telecommunications market for the Europe-
an Union.
 Economies of scale also act as a stimulus for the convergence of ICT policies 
in terms of the selection of standards and technologies. So long as the production 
volume of a given product is indirectly related to the cost per unit of the equipment, a 
country has incentives to select a similar technological standard as the one previous-
ly adopted by other countries in order to benefit from lower costs in the acquisition 
of the equipment, which in turn makes ICT products and services more affordable. 
The adoption of common digital television standards, which results in a reduction 
of the unit cost of set-top boxes, serves as an example. The selection of norms for 
fourth-generation mobile carriers is another example.
 Obviously, the size of regional economies impacts the importance of this var-
iable when promoting policy convergence. For example, Brazil has little incentive 
to consider the public policies of neighboring countries when selecting a standard; 
by virtue of its size, it already finds itself well beyond the inflection point of the ICT 
scale economies curve. At the other end of the spectrum, Central American countries 
have a multitude of incentives to unify the markets in order to boost investment and 
reduce the costs of equipment.
3.2. Tendencies which drive the divergence of  public  policies
 So far we have reviewed the three forces that drive a convergence of ICT 
public policies: imitative diffusion, multinational private players, and economies of 
scale. However, other forces may play a “centrifugal” role. They are oriented towards 
promoting divergence and, consequently, autonomous policies and behaviors. 
-14-
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3.2.1. Divergent national  economic dynamics,  interests ,  and objectives
 The prior section of this paper dedicated to convergent forces discusses the 
role of institutions that act as platforms for the transmission of certain public pol-
icies. As an alternative view, it is important to consider the possibility that such 
institutions may lose a certain degree of coercive power or influence. This may 
occur partly as a result of economic changes that erode the relevance of certain 
institutions. For example, if the financial conditions of the nation do not manifest 
a need for multilateral organizations (e.g. the IMF) in order to renegotiate external 
debt (as was the case with South Korea at the time of the Asian crisis), the influen-
tial capacity of such organizations diminishes substantially.
 In the same vein, if the nation’s trade patterns are reoriented in terms of 
products and flows, the interest or the pressure to modify the regulatory frame-
work to satisfy the needs of buyers is greatly reduced. This example clearly occurs 
in Latin America as the proportion of the region’s foreign trade oriented towards 
China has increased in comparison to its trade with the United States. In this sense, 
countries in the region see less urgency to adapt their ICT regulatory and policy 
framework to cater to the interests of the United States or Europe. In fact, the trend 
toward the reentry of the state in the Latin American ICT sector directly correlates 
with the “decoupling” of Latin American economies with respect to the northern 
hemisphere and their realignment with Asia.
3.2.2. The role of  the state and the swing of  the pendulum back toward 
the service provider state
 After the wave of privatizations in the 1990s, Latin American countries are 
now split between two groups in regards to state participation in the sector. Led by 
the experience of past public policies, one group of countries believes that the provi-
sion of retail telecommunication services must be in the hands of the private sector. 
These countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. On 
the other hand, the other group of countries believes that the state must be involved 
in the provision of telecommunications services. This group includes Uruguay, Cos-
ta Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia. It is important to emphasize that this last 
stance does not necessarily mean the monopolization of service. In Costa Rica and 
Ecuador, for instance, the state operator competes with private sector operators in 
the fixed broadband market; in all other countries, multiple players comprise a vi-
brant wireless industry.
-15-
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 On the other hand, even in countries where the private sector has been the 
fundamental agent of retail service provision, the state has once again entered the 
sector through the creation of fiber optic backbone networks. For example, the Bra-
zilian government-owned Telebras enterprise tends to focus on the deployment of 
networks in an effort to secure the provision of telecommunications services in iso-
lated regions.11 On the same note, as part of its National Plan “Connected Argentina,” 
Argentina is deploying a 25,000 km long national fiber optic network operated by the 
state enterprise ARSAT.12  In Colombia, “Grupo Azteca” won a government-spon-
sored bid to build a 15,000 km fiber backbone network and connect 1,078 munici-
palities. In a similar vein, the Peruvian government approved the construction of 
a national fiber optics backbone network, focusing primarily on providing service 
in rural, isolated zones. Coincidentally, in July 2012, the government of Venezuela 
announced the construction of an 18,000 km national fiber optics backbone network, 
bringing broadband coverage to 90% of the population. 
 In conclusion, what at the end of the 1990s largely seemed to be a consensus 
in regards to the agent that should lead the deployment and provision of telecommu-
nication services process, Latin America has since assumed a more divided position 
where one group of countries recognizes the directive role of the private sector, while 
the other recognizes the primary role of the state in the sector. 
3.2.3. National  security
 Although this divergent tendency may have existed as early as the initial de-
ployment of international data networks that took place in the 1980s,13 it has assumed 
a new level of importance with recent revelations of cyber espionage. Believing that 
any storage of information on servers located outside the physical borders of a coun-
try increases the possibility of cyber espionage, numerous Latin American countries 
advocate for ICT policies that would allow them to control the flow of information 
by restricting its storage and processing outside of the national territory.
 This tendency encourages the divergence of public policies with respect to the 
model proposed by several of the more mature countries. It promotes mercantilist and 
autonomous behaviors that are also reflected in the Internet governance discussion.
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11.  The Telebras network is being jointly extended throughout the Brazilian national territory. As of June 2013 the fiber optics network had an extension of 
25.000 kms. interconnecting 1.300 municipalities. This past year, Telebras built 8.900 kms. joining together the state capitals of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
Belo Horizonte and Vitoria. Continuing the deployment of a national level in March of 2013, President Rousseff announced a network expansion project for 
an investment sum of US$ 25 billion for the next 10 years, which will include public and private associations, tariff reductions and credits from the BNDES.
12.  The Argentinian government allocated an investment of US$ 1,314 bn for the year 2013 to finance their plan. The investment is estimated to reach approxi-
mately US$ 3 bn in the next three years. In association with Arsat, the provincial government of Neuquén will build 1.200 kms of fiber optics networks.
13.  Recall the discussion of international data flows.
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3.2.4. Policies of  Internet  governance
 The WCIT conference that took place in Dubai in December 2012 demon-
strated the dividing line that exists within the communities of countries in regards 
to Internet governance.14 The opposing camps focused on the role of governments 
and the ITU in managing the Internet. The countries that signed - including China, 
Russia, Iran and some Arab and African countries (as well as several Latin American 
countries) – want more government control over the flow of information, the registry 
of domains, and the monetization of the Internet. Those countries that didn’t sign the 
treaty did so under the suspicion that this regulation against spam and over network 
security could lead to network censorship and monitoring.
 The list of countries that signed (and did not sign) the final documents shows 
the degree of divergence that exists within the Latin American region (see table 2).
Table 2.  WCIT:  Latin American signatories and non-signatories of the final documents.
 The list of signatories and non-signatories in Latin America partially relates 
to each country’s respective degree of state control over the Internet, a vision guided 
by different political philosophies (autocracy versus democracy). Cuba and Venezue-
la, for instance, have signed the documents. However, many Latin American coun-
tries signed not out of a desire to increase governmental control over the Internet, 
but rather because they estimated that their support could increase access to Inter-
net, subsequently, reducing the digital divide.15  At the same time, Uruguay, the most 
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Non-signatoriesSignatories
Argentina
Brazil
Cuba
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Peru
14.  Recall the discussion of international data flux.
15.  Aguerre, Carolina. “Beyond Dubai: Post WCIT Reflections from an Internet Governance Viewpoint.” LSE Network Economy Forum. London School of 
Economics, 4 Apr. 2013. Web. 16 Sept. 2013. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/nef/2013/04/04/postwcit-internet-governance/>.
democratically developed country, also signed. The group of non-signatories is more 
coherent in terms of political philosophy. However, Latin America exhibits a clear 
divergent philosophy of Internet governance. 
3.2.5. A perception that  the ICT policy model  of  mature countries has 
run its  course
 The previously discussed process of regulatory model imitation refers to re-
cipient countries’ (model “importers”) perception that not every leading country ex-
perience has yielded positive results. Notable examples include the United States’ 
local loop unbundling and the United Kingdom’s structural separation of the incum-
bent.  Ex post facto evaluation of these experiences indicated that, from the point 
of view of the original objectives and partly due to technological changes that took 
place after the adoption of the policies, these initiatives did not yield positive results. 
This evaluation has resulted in a position that rejects the model based on the analysis 
of the impact of the policies in other geographies. This rejection could be based on 
the analysis of the aggregated results of a given policy. For example, when defining 
a digital policy, the limited results generated so far by the Digital European Agenda16 
may force some countries to question the European Union’s assertion regarding the 
promotion of next generation networks.
 In this sense, when defining their public policies, countries may question the 
proposed model and opt for divergent alternatives due to the perception that some 
of the leading countries’ models have not generated optimal results. In this sense, 
the countries can learn from the best practices of other countries while recognizing 
and taking into account the negative experiences when making their own policies 
and decisions.
 That said, not all Latin American countries, however, share the view that 
the European model has run its course. For example, some countries still consider 
competitive remedies such as local loop unbundling and structural separation of 
the incumbent within a service-based competition paradigm, while others feel that 
infrastructure-based competition is the most appropriate policy.
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16.     See Katz, R. “Investment, infrastructure and competition in European telecommunications”, Intermedia May 2013, volume 41, issue 2. At the end of the 
year 2012, in spite of the ambitious goals of the Digital Agenda, only 11% of the population had coverage of domestic fiber optics, while the amount of fiber 
optic users within the 27 nations of the European Union totaled only 6 million. On the other hand, users of DOCSIS 3.0 high-speed broadband connection 
amounted to 7,5 million. Fourth-generation LTE networks provided coverage for only 1% of users, projecting to reach 20% by the end of 2017. This coverage 
may be compared to the actual coverage in Korea (20%) and the United States (8%).
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3.3. Conclusion regarding divergent convergence of  Latin American 
ICT policies
 Just as Levi-Faur and Jordana anticipated, divergent convergence in the Latin 
American public policy and ICT regulation field clearly exists.  The following ta-
ble summarizes the different forces and demonstrates the tension that arises when 
countries face contradictory pressures, thereby reducing the degree of efficiency and 
consistency in the formulation of public policies (see table 3).
Table 3.  Convergent and divergent forces in ICT policy in Latin America
 Going back to the concept of divergent convergence, the divergent tendencies 
may be characterized as fundamental and nontrivial, which reinforces the need to 
construct regional spaces where the dialogue between policy makers will allow us to 
build on the “centripetal” factors and limit the impact of “centrifugal” tendencies.
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Divergent forcesConvergent forces
· Exportation of regulatory models
· Regional expansion of global operators
· Economies of Scale in ICT investment
· Coordination of radio spectrum policies to 
manage interference
· Expansion of regulatory authorities as a 
common institutional framework
· Divergent national economic interests 
and objectives
· The role of the state and the swing back 
of the pendulum towards a service 
providing state
· National security
· Internet governance policies
· Depletion of the mature country model
4. THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF A REGIONAL 
REGULATION SPACE
 Academic research has determined that a series of mechanisms – ranging from 
the imposition of a predetermined regime to the rational analysis of options and their 
impact – guide the diffusion of public policies (Dolowitz & March, 1996, 2000). In the 
first case, the adoption of a policy is defined as one of “coercive transference,” while 
at the other end of the spectrum it is defined as “voluntary transference.” The role of 
institutions in the diffusion process of regulatory models varies based on their level 
of influence, ranging from a coercive imposition to a voluntary transfer based on the 
assimilation of information. For example, imposition occurs through mechanisms of 
conditionality (privatizing an operator as a condition for the grant of credit). On the 
other end of the spectrum, an institution can only facilitate the diffusion of regulatory 
model information. Between these two extremes, we find coercive attitudes (obliga-
tory adoption of a certain model imposed by obligations established by international 
agreements) as well as more voluntary attitudes that also recognize an unavoidable 
necessity (liberalizing the telecommunications market in order to send the message 
to the capital markets that the country wants to promote direct foreign investment).17 
This scheme allows us to piece together the way that the diffusion of ICT policies has 
been adopted in different contexts (see figure 2).
Figure 2.  The role of institutions and the transfer of regulatory models
Source:  Based on Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)
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17.     See Heinsz, W. J., Zelner, B. A. and Guillen, M. F. (2004). International coercion, emulation and policy diffusion: market-oriented infrastructure reforms, 
1977-1999. William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 713 (July 2004);  Busch, P. and Jorgens, H.(2005).  International Sources of cross-national 
policy convergence and their interactions. Paper presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Dolowitz, D.P. and Marsh, D. (2000). The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making, Governance 13 (1), 5-23.
VOLUNTARY 
TRANSFER
(transfer by 
learning)
COERCIVE 
TRANSFER
(direct imposition)
ULL in Europe
OBLIGATED TRANSFER
(transfer as a result of treaty obligations)
Commonwealth influ-
ence for structural sep-
aration in New Zeland
BOUNDED-RATIONALITY
IMF/World Bank pres-
sure to privatize wire-
line carrier
CONDITIONALITY
VOLUNTARY BUT DRIVEN BY 
PERCEIVED NECESSITY (such as 
the need to promote FDI)
Auction of Band B 
spectrum in Brazil 
(1994)
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 Table 4 clarifies the role that institutions play in promoting regulatory models 
(both in a coercive and voluntary way).
Table 4:  Models of institutional influence
 Very similar to coercion, conditional transfer of public policies, manifests it-
self in situations where banking institutions multilaterally impose certain conditions 
in order to renegotiate external debt. These conditions generally refer to the imple-
mentation of reforms, which may include the privatization of a telecommunications 
operator or the aperture of a telecommunications market to direct foreign investment 
(such as the case of South Korea in the context of the Asian crisis of the 1990s).18  In 
their analysis, Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen (2004) observed that the coercive transfer-
ence effect is increasing, as is the range of the imposed conditions for the adoption of 
a particular policy. 
 In the absence of coercion, the availability of information as well as the learn-
ing process guide the adoption of regulatory models. The formulators of the public 
policies act rationally while maximizing objectives and resolving clearly exposed 
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MechanismInfluence model
Conditionality
Obligatory adoption
Change in the reg-
ulatory framework 
as a condition for 
access to benefits
Change in the 
regulatory frame-
work imposed by 
international treaty 
obligations
Change in the 
regulatory frame-
work as a direct 
result of a perceived 
need for benefits
Examples
The IMF’s role in promoting 
the privatization of telecommuni-
cation operators as a condition to 
access credit lines
Adoption of unbundled local loop 
policies in the European Union
Auctioning of the B band spec-
trum in Brazil in 1994 to signal to 
the capital markets the country’s 
desire to open the economy to 
direct foreign investment
Structural separation of the tele-
communications operator in New 
Zealand following an assessment of 
Openreach in the United Kingdom
Voluntary adoption 
alluding to an unavoida-
ble necessity
Voluntary adoption 
influenced by informa-
tion diffusion
Change in the 
regulatory frame-
work following 
information regard-
ing countries under 
similar conditions
18.     See Heinsz, W. J., Zelner, B. A. and Guillen, M. F. (2004). International coercion, emulation and policy diffusion: market-oriented infrastructure reforms, 
1977-1999. William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 713 (July 2004);  Busch, P. and Jorgens, H.(2005).  International Sources of cross-national 
policy convergence and their interactions. Paper presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Dolowitz, D.P. and Marsh, D. (2000). The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making, Governance 13 (1), 5-23.
problems. Analysis, learning, and persuasion determine this model of behavior, al-
though it may be limited by the lack of technical resources.
 Within this context, institutionalized communication within “regional regula-
tory spaces” may enhance the transfer of resources and analysis, the process of learn-
ing from other experiences, and the comparison of independently developed policies. 
For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) demonstrated that social and institutional 
structures play a positive role in the stimulation of policy convergence. In this sense, 
the cooperative search for solutions to specific problems (March and Simon, 1958) as 
well as simple organizational imitation facilitate institutional convergence.
 This process contains rational decision-making elements. It is guided by an 
analysis of similar problems in the search for common solutions among experts 
with the same objectives and decision-making mechanisms (Haas, 1992; DiMaggio 
and Powell, W., 1991). Research also shows that while elements that trigger the 
convergence process may be technical and related to harmonization problems, this 
discussion may lead to the formulation of more generic public policies. In other 
words, while a regional space may initially be dedicated to technical coordination 
(frequency harmonization), its reach may extend to more general areas of ICT poli-
cy.19 In this context, the behavior of certain countries has led to a proactive attitude 
within international institutions, resulting in innovative solutions to public policy 
problems that have in turn contributed to the adoption of the model. The European 
Union, the OECD, and other international institutions have all followed this process 
of persuasion.
 Research has also shown the positive role that “regional regulatory spaces” 
play, assuming three conditions are met. First, evidence that an increase in members 
both reduces the variance of positions and also stimulates the convergence of regu-
latory frameworks must guide the need to include the greatest number of countries 
within the regulation space. In this sense, public policy convergence depends on the 
interaction between political actors, which increases proportionally to the institu-
tional density. Second, as expected, convergence of public policies increases if the 
regulatory space has the legal power to go beyond the declaration of its intentions. 
Third, the efficiency of the public policy diffusion mechanism increases if the agents 
involved in the transmission of models share codes and norms.
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19.     See Kern (2000), who shows that models of public policy are transferred in a more efficient way between members of institutions than on the basis of 
bilateral contracts between countries.
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5. THE NEED FOR THE CREATION OF A REGIONAL 
REGULATORY SPACE IN LATIN AMERICA
 Having already demonstrated the positive impact of “regional regulatory 
spaces” on the convergence of ICT frameworks and public policies, we must now 
show the importance of their development for Latin America. Despite the number 
of regional institutional-level regulatory discussions in the region, convergence is 
non-evident. The division of Latin American signatories and non-signatories of the 
WCIT final document serves as a clear example of this problem.
 The lack of progress toward a framework that promotes the deployment of 
regional Internet interconnection infrastructure serves as another example of limited 
public policy convergence. To expound upon this example, 63% of all Latin American 
Internet traffic is comprised of outbound international traffic. Of this 63%, 14% is traf-
fic amongst Latin American countries that interconnects in the United States. Anoth-
er 19% of the international traffic is used to access international content (e.g. Google 
(although in certain cases, these are already hosted in the region)). Latin America 
incurs a cost of US$ 1.8 billion in yearly international data transports as a result of 
the uneven development of regional Internet connection infrastructure. Combined 
with the existing investments in fiber optics backbone networks, an approximate 
investment of US$ 60 million may reduce international transit costs by 38%. With 
this investment, the cost of broadband tariffs could decrease by an estimated 8%-
10%. From a financial standpoint, this investment is highly sustainable beyond the 
massive social and economic benefits that it will provide. From the standpoint of this 
cost/benefit equation, it is imperative to “federalize” infrastructure development 
and think in terms of a regional unified framework for action.
 Unfortunately, the numerous recommendations by various international or-
ganizations to deploy regional Internet exchange points (IXPs), have been largely 
disregarded. For example, in 2000, APEC’s TEL group released the ICAIS study 
(“International Charging Agreements for Internet Services”), identifying the need 
for interconnection and traffic exchange nodes. These recommendations were rat-
ified a posteriori in the Fourth Ministerial Reunion (TELMIN 4, Annex B) in 2000, 
where Internet connection guidelines were published. These guidelines included 
recommendations for the promotion of increased interconnectivity. They also stated 
that governments should not intervene in the market, except when dominant enter-
prises or de facto monopolies exist, in which case this intervention should aim to 
incentivize competition.  The group also felt that the parties should negotiate the 
prices themselves, reflecting the contribution of each network towards the com-
munication, the usage that each party benefits from, and the end-to-end cost of the 
international transport. 
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 2001 saw the creation of the NAPLA Regional Interconnection Forum. Start-
ing in 2006, other forums have adopted several of its recommendations, especially 
ECLAC. ECLAC intervened in the 2009 Internet governance forum, which took place 
in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, by raising the subject of interconnection. It emphasized 
that the Internet is still regarded and treated as a value-added service and that gov-
ernments, especially in Latin America, have not been able to utilize traditional regu-
latory tools to promote the development of a more efficient interconnection.
In the same year, at its fifteenth reunion in Bariloche, Argentina, the Permanent Con-
sultative Committee I admitted Resolution 160, which recommends the promotion 
of local and sub-regional interconnection nodes. It also stipulates the need for the 
promotion of local content development and the generation of content distribution 
networks (“content delivery networks”) within the region. Furthermore, it also push-
es for a decrease in backhaul costs. 
 Finally, several recommendations emerged at the Connect Americas Summit 
(ITU – Panama, 2012). Governments, multilateral financial organizations, private 
sector, and civil society organizations (NGOs) convened to propose and implement 
backbone infrastructures. The summit advocated for regional network development 
in order to increase the capillarity and support for nonprofit organizations, which 
would promote IXP development.  The group encouraged governments to intervene 
in the market whenever uncompetitive practices existed. The summit also recom-
mended the stimulation of mirror services in order to diminish international traffic 
and, in turn, create the local and regional content that would generate relevant uses 
for the Internet.
 Despite these recommendations and declarations, the reality of regional in-
terconnection infrastructure deployment shows that some countries (Brazil, Argen-
tina) are significantly more advanced than others (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela) in 
terms of IXP deployment. In conclusion, at least in the field of Internet interconnec-
tion, we observe a policy convergence that is not followed by concrete actions other 
than those initiatives adopted independently at the national level. Therefore, there 
exists, at least in this case, a need to develop “regional regulatory spaces” that go 
beyond the rhetoric and focus on the implementation of concrete action plans that 
make these declarations a reality.
 Beyond the need to stimulate convergence of public policy implementation, 
global trends bring a sense of urgency to the need for “regional regulatory spaces.” 
Following the WCIT conference in Dubai, a number of researchers have begun to no-
tice the benefits of migrating Internet governance toward a “Federation” of regional 
units. For example, Yoo (2013) believes that decentralization of the management, gov-
ernance, and development of Internet-related public policies will increase flexibility, 
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innovation, and network scalability. Similarly, Noam (2013) states that the outcome 
in Dubai signals a beginning of the fragmentation of the web, but it does not mean 
the end of interoperability, which may still occur in instances such as ICANN (Inter-
net Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers).  Other European researchers 
including Drake (2013) and Kleinwachter (2013) have reiterated this belief. Drake 
states that, in regard to Internet governance, the global unified system of organized 
multilateralism is becoming obsolete in regard to Internet governance. The author 
emphasizes the need to establish a distributed decentralized system that promotes 
both cooperation and competition between regions. In this context, he sheds light 
upon a stage of governance and regulation composed of bilateral agreements be-
tween nations with similar philosophies and political and economic contexts.
 Katz (2013), the author of this paper, agrees with Drake, but emphasizes that 
economic needs determine the evolution of a fragmented system of governance. One 
fundamental problem remains to be specified: that of giving more content and defini-
tions to the concept of Federation in order for this to represent a significant advance-
ment with respect to the actual system and not a mere regression to anarchy.
 If we assume that the paradigm of the future is Federation, and that Internet 
governance is the metaphor that engulfs a major part of ICT policies, what are the 
implications for Latin America? Economic, geographical, and developmental inter-
ests as well as the promotion of political systems based on democratic participation 
require the region to be unified around certain public policy stances that should be 
translated into frameworks for action. The federative context determines the need 
for Latin America to assume a unique position not only in subjects related to Internet 
governance, but also in the implementation of public policies that reflect the singu-
larity of the region. Without failing to recognize the tendencies that drive divergence 
between the countries of this region, the creation of “regional spaces” will help to 
leverage convergent aspects.
 In this context, we must consider the extent to which pre-existing instances 
fulfill a role of “regional regulatory space” that go beyond technical coordination? 
This paper aims to advance the institutional formulation that goes beyond previous 
efforts (CEPAL, CITEL, Regulatel), although it could stem from one of the existing 
organizations. This coordination would imply an agreement that the scope of the 
discussion should go beyond technical coordination, stepping into the formulation 
of public policies for the ICT sector, especially in areas related to innovation. Second-
ly, it is necessary to resolve the conflict that arises between regional instances whose 
modus operandi is bottom-up, open, and regional, as well as the formulation of pub-
lic policy at a national level that tends to be less participative. Thirdly, the new “re-
gional space” should assume responsibilities that extend past the simple declarative 
dimension. Without even reaching the level of the European Commission, it would 
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be useful to drive the public policy diffusion mechanisms that pursue convergence 
toward a dimension of “stimulated transference.” While the new space will not have 
a legal power, it will greatly benefit from a power that allows for more than just the 
mere declaration of intentions.
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